Motive and Opportunity Test Survives Congressional Death Knell in Private Securities Litigation Reform Act by Dube, Michael R
Boston College Law Review
Volume 42
Issue 3 Number 3 Article 3
5-1-2001
Motive and Opportunity Test Survives
Congressional Death Knell in Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act
Michael R. Dube
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr
Part of the Securities Law Commons
This Notes is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Boston College Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. For more information,
please contact nick.szydlowski@bc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Michael R. Dube, Motive and Opportunity Test Survives Congressional Death Knell in Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act, 42 B.C.L. Rev. 619 (2001), http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr/vol42/
iss3/3
MOTIVE AND OPPORTUNITY TEST
SURVIVES CONGRESSIONAL DEATH
KNELL IN PRIVATE SECURITIES
LITIGATION REFORM ACT
Abstract: Congress enacted the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act
in 1995, in an effort to stop frivolous securities fraud suits. Key to the
effort was the imposition of a heightened pleading standard requiring
plaintiffs to "state with particularity facts giving rise to a strong
inference that the defendant acted with the required state of mind."
There has been considerable controversy regarding whether Congress
codified the "motive and opportunity" prong of the pleading standard
historically used by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit. This Note argues that Congress intended to halt use of the
motive and opportunity test in favor of a heightened and uniform
pleading standard.
INTRODUCTION
Congress enacted the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act
(PSLRA) in 1995, in an effort to stop frivolous securities fraud suits.'
Key to the effort was the imposition of a heightened pleading stan-
dard requiring plaintiffs to "state with particularity facts giving rise to
a strong inference that the defendant acted with the required state of
mind."2 Congress intended 'federal courts to apply the new standard
uniformly.3 It was Congress's hope that a stringent pleading standard
would keep plaintiffs pushing baseless suits from reaching the discov-
ery stage, thereby reducing the sums such plaintiffs could extract in
settlements from defendant companies. 4 Conflicting accounts of the
' See Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA), 15 U.S.C. § 78-u4
(Stipp. 1999); Scott H. Moss, The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act: The &loiter Debacle,
30 SETON HALL L. REV. 1279,1281 (2000).
2 See 15 U.S.C. § 78-u4(b) (2) (Stipp. 1999); Moss, supra note 1, at 1281-82.
3 See SECURITIES LITIGATION REFORM ACT, H.R. CONF. REP. No. 109-369, at 13702.
(1995) [hereinafter Conference Report].
4 See Michael A. Dorelli, Striking Back at "Extortionate" Securities Litigation: Silicon Graphics
Leads the Way to a Truly Heightened and Uniform Pleading Standard, 31 IND. L. REV. 1189,
1199-95 (1998). The PSLRA provides that discovery be stayed during the pendency of any
motion to dismiss unless the court finds upon the motion of any party that particularized
619
620	 Boston College Law Review
	 [Vol. 42:619
legislative history documenting the inclusion of this heightened
pleading standard, together with subsequent interpretations by the
courts, however, has thwarted the hope of a uniform standard. 5
Central to the controversy is whether Congress intended to codify
the "motive and opportunity" prong of the pleading standard histori-
cally used by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Cir-
cuit in securities fraud suits under the Securities Exchange Act of
1934. 6
 Part I of this Note discusses the origin of the motive and op-
portunity test7
 and the legislative history of the PSLRA as it relates to
congressional adoption or rejection of that tests Part II of this Note
will discuss the divergent interpretations of the PSLRA's heightened
pleading standard by the United States Courts of Appeals. 9 Part IV of
this Note will argue that Congress intended to end use of the motive
and opportunity test.i° This Note concludes by suggesting that the
failure of federal courts uniformly to reach this conclusion calls for
remedial action by Congress or a resolution by the Supreme Court in
order to ensure that the goal of the PSLRA—namely, the dismissal of
frivolous suits before discovery increases the value of settlement—
does not go unmet.
discovery is necessary to preserve evidence or to prevent undue prejudice to that party. See
15 U.S.C. 78-u4((b) (3) (B).
5
 See, e.g., Moss, supra note 1, at 1279-80; Lisa A. Herrera, Comment, Will Motive, Op-
portunity and Recklessness No Longer Constitute Scienter for Fraud? A Survey of Recent Federal Dis-
bid Court Decisions After the Enactment of the 1995 Private Secutities Litigation Reform Act, 26
PEET. L. REV. 379, 382 (1999); Dorelli, supra note 4, at 1190; Michael B. Dunn, Note, Plead-
ing Scienter After the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act: Or, a Textualist Revenge, CORNELL L.
REv. 193 (Nov. 1998).
6 See 15 U.S.C. § 78a et seq. (Supp. 1999); Dorelli, supra note 4, at 1189-90. Many of the
complaints to which this pleading standard is applied allege insider trading by corporate
insiders in contravention of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. See 15 U.S.C. § 78a et.
seq. Rule 10b-5, promulgated by the Securities and Exchange Commission under that Act,
makes it unlawful for any person to use any means or instrumentality of interstate com-
merce, or of the mails, or of any facility of any national securities exchange, (1) to employ
any device, scheme or artifice to defraud, (2) to make any untrue statement of a material
fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in
the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or (3) to en-
gage in any act, practice or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud
or deceit upon any person in connection with the purchase or sale of any security. See 17
C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2000). The Securities and Exchange Con llll ission has held that Rule
1013-5 requires insiders to abstain from trading when they possess non-public, material
information, or to disclose the information prior to trading. See In the Matter of Cady,
Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 911 (1961).
7 See infra notes 11-14 and accompanying text.
8 See infra notes 15-25 and accompanying text.
9
 See infra notes 26-214 and accompanying text.
1 ° See infra notes 215-288 and accompanying text.
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I. THE MOTIVE AND OPPORTUNITY TEST
In 1987, in Beck v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that plaintiffs
pursuing securities fraud actions must plead "factual allegations [that]
give rise to a "strong inference" that the defendants possessed the
requisite fraudulent intent."11 Effectively, the Second Circuit's stan-
dard allowed securities fraud plaintiffs to establish this strong infer-
ence of fraudulent intent by (I) showing the defendant had motive to
commit fraud and the opportunity to commit it, or (2) by presenting
strong circumstantial evidence of conscious misbehavior or reckless-
ness. 12 The shared usage of the "strong inference" language in the
PSLRA and in Second Circuit decisions might be interpreted to sug-
gest Congress sought to make all courts apply the Second Circuit
standard." After all, "where Congress uses terms that have accumu-
lated settled meaning under . the common law, a court must infer,
unless the statute otherwise dictates, that Congress means to incorpo-
rate the established meaning of these terms." 14
Despite the PSLRA's use of similar language, the legislative his-
tory of the PSLRA suggests Congress likely did not intend to adopt
the Second Circuit standard in all its contours." In fact, Congress re-
jected an amendment to the PSLRA offered by Senator Arlen Specter
of Pennsylvania, which would have adopted explicitly the Second Cir-
cuit's motive and opportunity test." Senator. Specter's amendment
would have allowed courts to find a strong inference of scienter where
the plaintiff had alleged facts showing the defendant had both motive
and opportunity to commit fratid, or facts that constitute strong cir-
cumstantial evidence of conscious misbehavior or recklessness by the
defendant. 17 Additional evidence that Congress did not seek to codify
the Second Circuit's standard is found in the Conference Report on
the PSLRA, in which the Conference Managers stated:
Regarded as the most stringent pleading standard, the Sec-
ond Circuit requirement is that the plaintiff must state facts
with particularity, and that these facts, in turn, must give .rise
11 820 F.2d 46, 50 (2d. Cir. 1987) (internal citations omitted).
12 See Dorelli, supra note 4, at 1196-97.
is See id. at 1200-01.
14 1d. at 1201 (quoting NLRB v. Amax Coal Co., 453 U.S. 322, 329 (1981)).
15 See id. at 1196, 1201; Moss, supra note 1, at 1283; Herrera, supra note 5, at 384.
16 See Dorelli, supra note 4, at 1201-02.
17 See id.
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to a "strong inferenCe" of the defendant's fraudulent intent.
Because the Conference Committee intends to strengthen
existing pleading requirements, it does not intend to codify
the Second Circuit's case law interpreting this pleading
standard. 18
Furthermore, a footnote to the above statement goes on to explain
that, "[l]ar this reason, the Conference Report chose not to include
in the pleading standard certain language relating to motive, oppor-
tunity or recklessness. ""
Moreover, in his veto message, President Clinton made it clear
that he interpreted the PSLRA as passed by Congress as calling for a
tougher pleading standard than that used by the Second Circuit. 2°
The President's message included this passage:
I am prepared to support the high pleading standard of the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit—the highest
pleading standard of any Federal circuit court. But the con-
ferees make crystal clear in the Statement of Managers their
intent to raise the standard even beyond that level. I am not
prepared to accept that. 21
The President went on to say that Congress "specifically indicated that
they were not adopting the Second Circuit case law but instead in-
tended to 'strengthen' the existing pleading requirements of the Sec-
ond Circuit. All this shows that the conferees meant to erect a higher
barrier to bringing suit than any now existing." 22
Although the Conference Report and the President's veto mes-
sage would appear to make matters "crystal clear," Congress itself has
ensured that some murkiness remains. 23
 In 1998, in comments on the
passage of the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998,
the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs
stated:
'8 Id. at 1202 (quoting Conference Report, supra note 3, at 13702).
"'Id. at 1202 (quoting Conference Report, supra note 3, at note 23).
213 See id.; Dunn, supra note 5, at 219.
21
 PRIVATE SECURITIES LITIGATION REFORM ACT OF 1995, VETO MESSAGE FROM THE
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, H. Doc. No. 104-150, at 15215.
22 Id.
23 See Laura R. Smith, Comment, The Battle Between Plain Meaning and Legislative History
Which Will Decide the Standard for Pleading Scienter After the Private Securities Litigation Reform
Act of 1995 r, 39 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 577, 582-83 (1999) (discussing new legislative history
on subject that resulted from passage of Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of
1988).
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Neither the PSLRA nor 5.1260 in any way alters the scienter
standard in federal securities fraud suits. It was the intent of
Congress, as was expressly stated during the legislative de-
bate on the PSLRA, and particularly during the debate on
overriding the President's veto, that the PSLRA establish a
uniform federal standard on pleading requirements by
adopting the pleading standard applied by the Second Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals.24
Subsequently, upon signing the Securities Litigation Uniform Stan-
dards Act, the President indicated he did so only because it made the
Second Circuit standard the uniform standard for pleading securities
fraud. 25
DIFFERING INTERPRETATIONS
Not surprisingly, in the wake of ambiguous statutory language
and mixed messages from Congress, the United States Courts of Ap-
peals have not interpreted the pleading terms of the PSLRA uni-
formly, 26 The Second and Third Circuits have adhered to the motive
and opportunity test. 27 The Sixth and Eleventh Circuits have indicated
the motive and opportunity test is no longer applicable, but that such
pleadings continue to be relevant, nonetheless. 28 The First Circuit has
held that pleadings of motive and opportunity will survive a motion to
dismiss, provided they are sufficient to give rise to the required strong
inference of fraudulent intent. 29 Finally, the Ninth Circuit has held
that the PSLRA amounted to an unequivocal prohibition on the mo-
tive and opportunity test."
See id. at 583 (quoting THE SECURITIES LITIGATION UNIFORM STANDARDS ACT UP
1998, S. REP. No. 105-182 (1998)). The Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act was
passed in response to the fact that plaintiffs' attorneys had begun filing securities suits in
state courts to avoid the heightened pleading standards of the PSLRA. See Developments in
the Law—The Paths of Civil Litigation: IV. Class Action Reform: An Assessment of Recent Judicial
Decisions and Legislative Initiatives, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1806, 1820-21 (2000).
" See Smith, supra note 23, at 583.
26 See Bruce Rubenstein, A New Attempt to Torpedo Class Actions, CORPORATE LEGAL
TIMES, Sept. 2000, at 1.
27 See In re Advauda Corp. Securities Litigation, 180 F.3d 525, 533-35 (3d Cir. 1999);
Press v. Chemical Investment Services Corp., 166 F.3d 529, 537-38 (2d Cir. 1999).
28 See Bryant v. Avado Brands, Inc., 187 E3d 1271, 1285-86 (11th Cir. 1999); In re Corn-
share, Inc., Securities Litigation, 183 F.3d 542, 551 (6th Cir. 1999).
" See Greebel v. FFP Software, Inc., 194 F.3d 185, 195-96 (1st Cir. 1999).
" See In re Silicon Graphics, Inc. Securities Litigation, 183 F.3d 970, 974 (9th Cir.
1999).
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A. The Second and Third Circuits Adhere to Motive and Opportunity
The United States Courts of Appeals for the Second and Third
Circuits, as noted, have upheld the validity of the motive and oppor-
tunity test while acknowledging that under the PSLRA such allega-
tions must be stronger to withstand a motion to dismiss than had
been the case previously. 31 In 1999, in Press v. Chemical Investment Serv-
ices Corp., the Second Circuit became the first federal appeals court to
declare that the motive and opportunity test survived enactment of
the PSLRA.32 The Second Circuit addressed the PSLRA pleading
standard in the context of a suit filed by Donald Press, who had pur-
chased a Treasury bill (T--bill) front Chemical." Chemical sold the T-
bill to Press for $99,488.42, to mature in six months at $102,000. 34 Fol-
lowing the purchase, Press asked Chemical either to express-mail him
the proceeds at maturity or to allow him to pick up the proceeds on
the day of maturity." Chemical informed Press that he could not pick
up the proceeds.36 Chemical indicated, however, that the proceeds
could be express-mailed or wired, but at an additional cost." Having
chosen to have Chemical express-mail the proceeds to him, Press re-
ceived a check for $101,985 four days after the date of maturity." One
of those days was a Saturday and another was a Sunday."
Press's claim against Chemical was three-fold.4° First, he asserted
that Chemical fraudulently failed to disclose that the funds would not
be immediately available upon maturity. 41 The result, Press com-
plained, was that the period for which the yield should have been cal-
culated was longer than indicated by Chemical, producing a fraudu-
lently inaccurate yield rate. 42 Press contended that Chemical was
motivated by a desire to use his funds for a longer period of time. 43
Second, Press said he was not told by Chemical that it would take a
31
 See Advanta, 180 F.3d at 534-35; Press, 166 F.3d at 538.
32 See 166 F.3d at 538.
33 See id. at 532.
See id.
" See id. at 533.
" See id.





42 See Press, 166 F.3d at 533. A yield rate is the total periodic profit au investor receives,
or is entitled to, for an investment in a certain asset. See EITAN A. AVNEYON, DICTIONARY OF
FINANCE 485 (1988).
93
 See Press, 166 F.3d at 533.
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$158.86 markup on the transaction, a sum he described as an exces-
sive fee relative to the bill's yield and one requiring disclosure by
Chemical." Finally, Press maintained that Chemical had a fiduciary
duty to disclose the fee to him."
In reviewing Press's complaint to determine whether it satisfied
the pleading standard set out in the PSLRA, the Second Circuit reit-
erated its support for the motive and opportunity test." The court
wrote: "As a pleading requirement, a plaintiff must either (a) allege
facts to show that defendants had both motive and opportunity to
commit fraud' or (b) allege facts that 'constitute strong circumstantial
evidence of conscious misbehavior or recklessness." 47 The court ac-
knowledged its historical leniency, noting it had on prior occasions
found scienter on "fairly tenuous inferences."'" The court said its ap-
proach had been to reject general scienter allegations that could be
applicable to any publicly-held business that sought to have its stock
priced highly, while declining to establish a "nearly impossible" stan-
dard where a corporation's intent is at issue."
According to the court, Press's complaint "barely" alleged motive
and opportunity, but satisfied the standard nevertheless." He pled
that Chemical's motive was its desire to have the use of his funds and
that the opportunity was present because the proceeds were in
Chemical's control." The court added that Press's complaint was the
"barest of all pleading that would be acceptable."52 To find that it had
not met the motive and opportunity test, however, would have been to
make it "virtually impossible" fOr a plaintiff to plead scienter on the
part of a corporation, institution, bank or other financial entity when
the plaintiff could not point to "specifically greedy confluents from an
authorized corporate individual."55 In reaching its conclusion, the
court did not engage in a lengthy interpretation of the PLSRA plead-
ing standard or its legislative history, instead simply declaring that the
44 See id.
45 See id.
45 See id. at 538.
47 Id. at 538 (internal quotations omitted).




52 Id. at 538.
" See Press, 166 F.3d at 538.
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Act "heightened the requirement for pleading scienter to the level
used by the Second Circuit." 54
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, in
1999, in In re Advanta Corp. Securities Litigation, gave greater attention
to the plain meaning of the statute and its legislative history. 55 Ulti-
mately, however, the court reached a conclusion similar to the Second
Circuit, holding that motive and opportunity allegations would suffice
if supported by particular facts and giving rise to a strong inference of
scienter.56 The Third Circuit confronted allegations that Advanta, an
innovative and leading issuer of MasterCard and Visa credit cards, had
made false and misleading statements and material omissions regard-
ing its earnings potëntial and the value of its stock. 57
The plaintiffs in the case alleged that Advanta began issuing
cards carrying lower "teaser" rates and longer introductory periods
than was customary in the industry, decisions the plaintiffs said led to
riskier customers, many of whom defaulted. 58 The plaintiffs further
contended that these practices produced Advanta's $20 million first-
quarter loss in 1997. 58 The plaintiffs also complained that even when
it knew losses were inevitable, Advanta failed to disclose the situation,
and, in fact, made false or materially misleading statements." In par-
ticular, the plaintiffs pointed to a statement by the company's Vice
President for Investor Relations in which the officer indicated that
Advanta would, over the next six months, be converting more than $5
billion in accounts from die teaser rate of about 7% to its standard
rate of about 17%. 61 This statement was allegedly contradicted by a
subsequent statement by Advanta's chairman and former CEO in
which he said the company was not as aggressive as it could have been
in repricing." According to this statement, instead of repricing to
19%, the company repriced closer to 13% or 14%. 63 The plaintiffs
contended that the second statement proved the first was false and
misleading." Furthermore, the plaintiffs alleged that two individual
54 See id. at 537-38.
55 See 180 F.3d 525, 531-35 (3d Cii. 1999).
56 See id. at 533-34.
57 See id. at 528.
56 See id.
" See id.
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defendants at Advanta traded significant numbers of Advanta shares
while in possession of material, nonpublic information, violating in-
sider trading strictures.°
The Third Circuit said the PSLRA's legislative history was "am-
biguous and even contradictory" on the subject of whether the Act
adopted the motive and opportunity test. 66 The court then recounted
much of that legislative history in its decision. 67 Declining to give
'much weight to a history it considered complicated, however, the
court reached its decision based in large part on the plain language of
the statute. 68 The court noted that the "strong inference" wording is
very similar to the language used by the Second Circuit and that, leav-
ing aside the "state with particularity" requirement included in the
PSLRA, the two standards are "virtually identical."69 This led the court
to conclude that Congress intended to enforce a pleading standard
"approximately equal in stringency" to the Second Circuit standard."
The court explained this conclusion by pointing out that the Second
Circuit standard was regarded as the toughest prior to passage of the
PSLRA, making its adoption consistent with the legislature's intent to
deter frivolous securities litigation by strengthening pleading re-
quirements:71 The court also noted that when Congress passed the
PSLRA requiring plaintiffs to state facts "with particularity" would
have amounted to a heightened pleading standard even in jurisdic-
tions already applying the Second Circuit standard. 72
Regarding the state of the motive and opportunity test, the court
reasoned that if Congress wished to eliminate it, the PSLRA's drafters
could have clone so explicitly in the statute." The fact that Congress
chose not to do so, after considering including language that would
directly address the Second Circuit's case law, implies the legislature
elected to leave it to judicial interpretation, according to the Third
Circuit. 74 Taking advantage of that discretion, the court held that in
65 See Advanta, 180 F.3d at 529. The Securities and Exchange Commission requires that
insiders disclose such material information or abstain from trading before the material
becomes public knowledge. See In the Matter of Cady Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 911
(1961).
0° Advanta, 180 F.3d at 531.
°7 See id. at 531-33.
69 See id. at 533.
69 Id.
7° See id. at 534.
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the Third Circuit, a plaintiff could plead scienter by alleging facts "es-
tablishing a motive and an opportunity to commit fraud, or by setting
forth facts that constitute circumstantial evidence of either reckless or
conscious behavion" 75 According to the court, requiring that motive
and opportunity be supported by particular facts and that such facts
give rise to a strong inference of scienter would address the "previous
ease" of alleging motive and opportunity in cases of corporate officers
alleged to have committed securities fraud. 76 Henceforth, wrote the
court, "catch-all allegations that defendants stood to benefit from
wrongdoing and had the opportunity to implement a fraudulent
scheme are no longer sufficient, because they do not state facts with
particularity or give rise to a strong inference of scienter."77
Applying its new standard, the court found the plaintiffs' allega-
tions about the statement indicating Advanta planned to reprice $5
billion in accounts to 17% did not contain any specific facts to sup-
port an inference that the executive who made that remark, nor any-
one else at Advanta, had actual knowledge of the statement's falsity. 78
The court said the plaintiff produced no evidence to rebut the possi-
bility that Advanta intended to reprice accounts to 17% when the first
statement was made, but subsequently changed its business strategy. 79
Regarding optimistic statements by the company in the face of dete-
riorating results, the court found the plaintiffs merely made the con-
clusory assertion that Advanta acted knowingly and made "blanket
statements" that the individual defendants had to have been aware of
the coming losses because of their positions in the company, rather
than offering particular facts that would support a strong inference
that the company possessed the requisite scienter. 8°
B. The Ninth Circuit Clearly Rejects Motive and Opportunity
Among the federal appeals courts, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has embraced the most stringent inter-
75 Id. at 534-35.
75 See Advanta, 180 F.3d at 535.
77 Id.
78 See id. at 536. The court found the statement was covered by the PSLRA's "safe har-
bor," which protects certain "forward-looking" statements from Rule 10b-5 liability unless
the plaintiff proves it was made with "actual knowledge." See id. at 535-36.
79 See Advanta, 180 F.3d at 536.
Ha See id.
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pretation of the pleading standard under the PSLRA. 81 In 1999, in In
re Silicon Graphics, Inc. Securities Litigation, the Ninth Circuit famously
interpreted the PSLRA pleading standard, holding that the motive
and opportunity test was no longer applicable and conclUding that
plaintiffs must henceforth plead specific facts indicating at least a de-
gree of recklessness suggesting actual intent. 82 Silicon Graphics was
the target of a securities fraud class action alleging that the company
and six executives made misleading statements in an effort to drive up
the company's stock price while they engaged in insider trading. 83 In
July 1995, the company reported 45% revenue growth for fiscal year
1995 and projected similar results for the coming year. 84 Simultane-
ously, Silicon Graphics described plans for a new graphic design com-
puter that would help maintain its success.85 According to the plain-
tiffs, however, the company experienced quality control problems
with an ASIC chip, a primary coMponent of the new computer. 86 The
plaintiffs averred that, despite having knowledge of the problems, the
defendant officers told investors that production was continuing on
pace."
The plaintiffs further maintained that the problem with the ASIC
chips was not the only difficulty facing Silicon Graphics. 88 Sales to the
United States government and original equipment manufacturers
were declining, demand in Europe was slumping and a reorganization
of the Silicon Graphics sales force was proving difficult. 89 When inves-
tors recognized these problems, Silicon Graphics stock fell to a low of
$29 on October 9, 1995.90 Ten days later, the company declared reve-
nue had grown only 33% during the first quarter of 1996, which, ac-
cording to the plaintiffs, prompted a series of statements designed to
81 See Silicon Graphics, 183 F.3d at 977; Rubenstein, supra note 27, at 1. The Ninth Cir-
cuit is also alone in holding that'enacnnent of the PSLRA resulted in a heightened sub-
stantive state-of-mind requirement: deliberate recklessness. See Silicon Graphics, 183 F.3d at
977.
82 See id. at 979.
83 See id. at 979-80.
H4 See id. at 980.
" See id.
86 See Silicon Graphics, 183 F.3d at 980. An ASIC, or application-specific integrated cir-
cuit, is a computer chip designed for a specific use. See MICHAEL D. SCOTT, INTERNET AND
TECHNOLOGY LAW DESK REFERENCE 26, 307 (2001).
87 See Silicon GraphiCs, 183 F.3d at 980-81.
" See id. at 981.
8') See id.
00 See id.
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raise the price of Silicon Graphics stock. 91 The company also an-
nounced a stock repurchase plan.92
Meanwhile, problems with demand and the sales force reorgani-
zation continued." The plaintiffs alleged in their complaint that
company officers were aware of the difficulties as a result of internal
reports, but continued to make positive statements, which produced a
hike in Silicon Graphics' stock price. 94 It was around this time, in No-;
vember 1986, that company officers made the stock sales complained
of in the suit. 95
Shortly after the officers sold Silicon Graphics stock, investors
began to fear the company would again miss its growth targets and
the price of company stock began to drop.96 Again, according to the
plaintiffs, the company responded with false statements about com-
pany prospects.97 By the end of December, the stock had fallen once
again to $26, and in January 1996 the company confirmed that it
would not meet its projections." The following day, company stock
plunged to $21 and the plaintiffs filed suit several days later."
The Ninth Circuit considered two issues related to the PSLRA:
(1) what a plaintiff must allege to satisfy the requirement that she
state facts giving rise to a strong inference of the required state of
mind; and (2) the definition of the required state of mind.'" Regard-
ing the latter question, the court broke with most jurisdictions to find
that the scienter required under the PSLRA is "deliberate reckless-
ness."191
To arrive at what it considered the correct pleading standard, the
court toured the PSLRA's legislative history. 102
 The court took note of
the Conference Report and Congressional concern with abusive secu-
rities litigation, and determined that a heightened pleading standard
was one of the procedural barriers to non-meritorious lawsuits created
°I See id.
92 See Silicon Graphics, 183 F.3d at 981.
93 See id.
94 See id. at 981-82.
95 See id. at 982.
96
 See id.
97 See Silicon Graphics, 183 F.3d at 982.
" See id.
" See id.
160 See id. at 973, 975.
191 See id. at 977. The court based its holding on the fact that case law indicates that
recklessness in the context of the Securities Exchange Act must be a form of intentional
conduct. See Silicon Graphics, 183 F.3d. at 977.
192 See id. at 977-80.
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by the PSLRA.'°5 The court also noted that the Joint Conference
Committee declined to adopt the Specter Amendment, which would
have incorporated the Second Circuit standard. 104 In doing so, said
the court, Congress had "implicitly rejected" the two-prong test estab-
lished by the Second Circuit. 1 °5 The court brushed aside Congres-
sional adoption of the "strong inference" language from the Second
Circuit standard by reasoning that this was used only because it was
"facially more stringent" than wording from other circuits. 106 The
Ninth Circuit also pointed to President Clinton's veto message as evi-
dence Congress had rejected the Second Circuit standard. 107
The Ninth Circuit concluded that under the PSLRA, plaintiffs
"can no longer aver intent in general terms of mere 'motive and op-
portunity' or 'recklessness,' but rather, must state specific facts indi-
cating no less than a degree of recklessness that strongly suggests ac-
tual intent." 108 The court decided that although a showing of mere
recklessness or motive and opportunity might support a reasonable
inference of intent, such a complaint is "not sufficient to establish a
strong inference of deliberate recklessness. "109 Instead, PSLRA plain-
tiffs in the Ninth Circuit would have to plead, in great detail, facts that
constitute strong circumstantial evidence of deliberately reckless or
conscious misconduct."°
Turning to the complaint against Silicon Graphics, the court de-
clared that to avoid dismissal, the plaintiff must have provided a list of
all the relevant circumstances in great detail.'" The court described
the complaint as resting on two grounds: the existence of internal re-
ports that were contrary to positive public comments, and the sale of
Silicon Graphics stock by the officers. 112 The court faulted the plain-
tiffs for failing to give details about the reports, such as their contents,
who prepared them, who reviewed them and from whom the plain-
tiffs learned of them. 113 This failure left the court unable to deter-
mine whether there was any support for the allegation that the
1113 See id. at 977.
104 See id. at 978.
105 See id.
1 °6 See Silicon Gmphics, 183 F.3d at 979.
127 See id.
1" Id.'
109 Id. at 979.
110 See id.
111 See Silicon Graphics, 183 F.3d at 984.
112 See id. at 984.
112 See id.
632	 Boston College Law Review	 [Vol. 42:619
officers knew their statements were false when they made them.'" Re-
garding the stock sales, the court noted that all but two of the officers
named in the complaint sold a relatively small portion of their hold-
ings during the class period and that the tradings of the other two
officers were not sufficiently suspicious when considered alone. 115 The
court reasoned that although these assertions about the reports and
stock sales were sufficient to suggest an inference of deliberate reck-
lessness, they were not enough to raise a strong inference of such
conduct. 116 In sum, the court found the plaintiff's allegations indis-
tinguishable from the countless "fishing expeditions" that Congress
passed the PSLRA to deter. 117
C. The Sixth and Eleventh Circuits Hold Motive and Opportunity Still
Relevant
The United States Courts of Appeals for the Sixth and Eleventh
Circuits have taken a middle path between the Second and Third Cir-
cuits on the one hand, and the Ninth Circuit on the other.tt 8 The
Sixth and Eleventh Circuits have held that although bare allegations
of motive and opportunity may be relevant to a showing of scienter,
without more they are not sufficient to demonstrate the required state
of mind. 119
In 1999, in In re Comshare, Inc. Securities Litigation, the Sixth Cir-
cuit held that a bare pleading of motive and opportunity was in-
sufficient under the PSLRA. 12° Software company Comshare and sev-
eral of its officers and directors were the targets of a class action
suit. 121 On July 30, 1996, it was reported that Comshare had delayed
publication of its quarterly report because an audit of its United
Kingdom subsidiary was incomplete. 122 A week later, the company in-
dicated it would delay releasing fourth-quarter and year-ending results
114 See id. at 985.
In
 See id. at 987. The court further noted that it had not failed to notice five securities
action complaints filed in various United States District Courts by plaintiffs' counsel all
containing the same "boilerplate" charges of "negative internal reports" found in the Sili-
con Graphics complaint. See Silicon Graphics, 183 F.3d at 984,11.14.
"6 See id. at 984.
117 See id. at 988 (quoting Conference Report, supra note 3, at 13701).
116 See Bryant v. Avado Brands, Inc., 187 F.3d 1271, 1288 (11th Cir. 2000); In re Cons-
share, Inc. Securities Litigation, 183 F.3d 542, 552 (6th Cir. 1999).
"6 See Bryant, 187 F.3d at 1285-86; Cornshare, 183 F.3d at 551.
120 See 183 F.3d at 551.
' 2 ' See id. at 544.
162 See id. at 546.
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pending completion of a year-end audit, which had now been ex-
panded to include a detailed review of United Kingdom orders,
among others.'" The company acknowledged that it had discovered
letters making $4 million worth of United Kingdom orders condi-
tional. 124 At closing on August 6, Comshare stock was at $18 %, but by
the end of the following day's trading it had fallen by almost $7. 125 On
September 5, following its year-end audit, the company reported
$26.6 million in revenues for the fourth quarter, a decline from $28.8
million in the same quarter a year before. 126 The company also an-
nounced total revenue for the year was up 9.8% over 1995, even rec-
ognizing the problems with the conditional orders. 127
The complaint against Comshare alleged that the defendants
knowingly or recklessly disregarded the problems with conditional
orders and, through public misrepresentations about revenue,
fraudulently induced the plaintiffs to purchase Comshare stock at
artificially inflated prices. 128 The Comshare defendants maintained
that they took corrective measures upon discovering the side letter
agreements during the audit. 1 29
The United 'States District Court for the Eastern District of
Michigan dismissed the complaint, reasoning that the PSLRA re-
quired plaintiffs to allege facts giving rise to a strong inference of
knowing misrepresentation or intent. 130 The Sixth Circuit found the
District Court's interpretation of the PSLRA deficient, but affirmed
the result.'" Rejecting the position of the District Court—and the
Ninth Circuit in In re Silicon Graphics—that the PSLRA altered the
state of mind requirement for securities fraud, the court held that the
PSLRA merely changed the pleading standard to require plaintiffs to
plead a "strong inference" of the requisite state of mind. 132
In rejecting the motive and opportunity test, the Sixth Circuit
noted that the Second Circuit and other jurisdictions using the mo-
tive and opportunity test had held only that satisfaction of that test is
sufficient to adequately allege scienter, not that a showing of motive
125 See id.
124 see id.
125 Sec Comshare, 183 F.3d at 546.
126 See id.
127 See id.
126 See id. at 547.
129 .See id.
"0 See Comshare, 183 F.3d at 552.
im See id. at 594, 552.
12
 See id. at 552-53.
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and opportunity amounts to proof of the required state of mind—i.e.,
the defendant acted recklessly or knowingly.'" Accordingly, the court
concluded that under its plain interpretation of PSLRA, plaintiffs may
withstand a motion to dismiss by alleging facts that give rise to a
strong inference of reckless behavior, but not by alleging solely that
the defendants had a motive and the opportunity to commit fraud.' 34
In the court's view, facts showing motive and opportunity may be rele-
vant to a pleading of the required state of mind, but a bare pleading
of motive and opportunity would never alone be sufficient to give rise
to the required strong inference.'"
The court then held that the plaintiff's complaint essentially was
such a bare pleading of motive and opportunity.'" According to the
court, the plaintiffs simply alleged that the defendant officers and di-
rectors would garner greater compensation if Cotnshare's stock prices
increased and that the defendants profited by selling shares during
the class period.'" The court wrote that such claims of motive and
opportunity might be relevant on the question of recklessness, but
they did not, in the case of Comshare, support a strong inference that
the defendants acted with recklessness.' 38
Similarly, in 1999, in Bryant v. Avado Brands, Inc., the Eleventh
Circuit passed on the pleading standard question, holding that the
motive and opportunity test was no longer applicable and stating that
plaintiffs suing under the PSLRA must plead scienter with particular
facts that give rise to a strong inference of severe recklessness.'"
Avado Brands, formerly known as Apple South, Inc., was a corpora-
tion that owned and operated several chain restaurants, including
"Applebee's Neighborhood Grill and Bar" and "Tomato Rumba's." 14°
Shareholders of the company brought a class action alleging that the
corporation and several officers made false and misleading statements
and material omissions to inflate the price of the company's stock."'
During the class period of May 26, 1995 to September 24, 1996,
the company was expanding aggressively, purchasing restaurants and
"3 See id. at 551
"4
 See id.
"5 See Comshare, 183 F.3d at 551.





 See Bryant, 187 F.3d at 1285.
140 See id. at 1273.
141 See id.
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entering new territories, 142 In particular, it acquired eighteen "Apple-
bee's" restaurants in the Midwest, the integration of which the plain-
tiffs said proved difficult and ultimately unprofitable. 143 Similar com-
plaints were made regarding the earlier acquisition of the "Tomato
Rumba's" chain.'" The plaintiffs alleged that the assimilation harmed
Apple South's core business—namely, its restaurants in the South-
east. 145
The complaint alleged that the corporation's officers knew of the
problems because of a sophisticated internal reporting system, but
nevertheless continued to pursue the aggressive growth plan while
concealing negative material information.' In fact, the plaintiffs al-
leged that the company told analysts the new restaurants would have a
positive impact on profit margins and earnings-per-share. 147 Accord-
ing to the plaintiffs, such predictions facilitated the company's sale of
more than 10 million shares, plus $125 million in debt securities,
which enabled the corporation to adhere to its aggressive growth
without diluting the value of the insider defendant's holdings. 148 Dur-
ing the class period of May 26, 1995 to September 24, 1996, according
to the complaint, the insider defendants sold more than $19.6 million
in personal corporate holdings. 149 On the final day of the class period,
the defendants announced that the purchase of the eighteen Apple-
bee's restaurants had negatively impacted the company, earnings-per-
share would not reflect the 30%-35% growth predicted and would
likely not exceed the 1995 earnings-per-share rate, and expansion
plans would have to be scaled back. 15° Following the announcement,
Apple South stock fell 40%, to $12.25. 151
142 See id.
145 See id.
144 See Bryant, 187 F.3d at 1274.
145 See id. at 1273. Specifically, the plaintiffs charged that management problems at-
tending the company's expansion into the Midwest produced a high rate of turnover, forc-
ing the corporation to transfer managers front its core Southeast restaurants to the new
Midwest operations. See id. at 1274. This move left the core establishments devoid of expe-
rienced employees, harming results in those locations. See id. The plaintiffs contended that
the company responded by firing employees and cutting costs to meet short-terni earnings-
per-share estimates. See id. Poor service resulted and the return customer base diminished,
dimming the company's long-term outlook. See id.
146 See id. at 1274.
197 See id.
1971 See id.
145 See Bryant, 187 F.3(1 at 1279.
00 See id.
151 See id.
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The United States District Court for the Middle District of Geor-
gia held that the Second Circuit standard and motive and opportunity
test applied, and thus, denied Apple South's motion to distniss. 152 The
District Court did, however, recommend that the Sixth Circuit allow
an interlocutory appeal to determine whether the PSLRA had
changed the pleading standard for securities suits.'"
As the Eleventh Circuit saw it, the question was whether motive
and opportunity was sufficient to plead scienter—as it was in the Sec-
ond Circuit—or had Congress "merely borrow[ed]" the Second Cir-
cuit's "strong inference" language without adopting the motive and
opportunity test. 154 According to the court, the plain language of the
PSLRA meant that a plaintiff must plead with particularity facts giving
rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted in a severely reck-
less fashion. 155 Sounding a note similar to the Sixth Circuit in In re
Comshare, the court said allegations of motive and opportunity may be
relevant to a showing of recklessness, but without more they are not
sufficient to demonstrate the required state of mind. 158 The court said
the PSLRA phrase "required state of mind" clearly referred to a sub-
stantive standard, like willfulness or recklessness.'57 Motive and oppor-
tunity, by contrast, are kinds of evidence, which, when combined with
other evidence, might give rise to an inference of recklessness or will-
fulness. 158 In short, the motive and opportunity test can no longer be
applied because motive and opportunity do not constitute a state of
mind. 158 To support its rejection of the motive and opportunity test,
the court noted that at the time of the PSLRA's passage, only the Sec-
ond and Ninth Circuits favored its usage, suggesting it was not so well-
established that Congress would codify it sub silentio. 1. 60
Because it was hearing only an interlocutory appeal, the Eleventh
Circuit simply held that a securities fraud plaintiff must plead scienter
with particular facts that give rise to a strong inference of severe reek-
152 See id. at 1274-75.
155 See id. at 1275.
15' See Bryant, 187 F.3d at 1282. The court also addressed the substantive state of mind
question and found that the Eleventh Circuit's "severe recklessness" standard was unaf-
fected by the PSLRA. See id. at 1283.
155
 See id. at 1285.
156 See id. at 1285-86
157 See id. at 1286.
158
 See id.
159 See Bryant, 187 F.3d at 1285-86.
150 See id. at 1286.
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lessness. 161 The court then remanded the matter back to the District
Court to determine if the complaint against Apple South satisfied the
newly-articulated standard. 162 On remand, the District Court dis-
missed the plaintiffs' complaint, finding it failed to give rise to a
strong inference that Apple South and the individual defendants ei-
ther knew the statements were false or were reckless with regard to
their accuracy. 163
D. The First Circuit Requires Stmnger Evidence of Motive and Opportunity
The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit took a
unique approach to the problem, deciding that the question of
whether the PSLRA adopted the motive and opportunity test was be-
side the point.lM Instead, on its way to concluding that pleadings of
motive and opportunity would suffice if sufficiently strong, the First
Circuit reasoned that the categorization of certain patterns of facts,
such as motive and opportunity, to determine whether a sufficient
showing of scienter has been made at the pleading stage, is not the
correct approach. 165 For the First Circuit, the PSLRA amounted not to
a prohibition on the motive and opportunity test, but to a call for a
showing of a "strong" inference of fraud, rather than the "reasonable"
inference standard sometimes used previously in that circuit. 166
In 1999, in Greebel v. FTP Software, Inc., the First Circuit rejected
the defendant's argument that facts showing motive and opportunity
can never be enough to withstand a motion to dismiss, but noted that
merely pleading motive and opportunity, regardless of the strength of
the inferences conveyed by such facts will not be enough. 167 Lawrence
M. Greebel and others purchased FTP stock from July 14, 1995 to
January 3, 1996, and subsequently filed a securities suit against the
company. 169 During the class period, the stock peaked at $38.875. 169
On January 4, 1996, when the company announced that sales growth
was in decline and earnings would be lower, the stock fell 52%, drop-
161 See id. at 1287.
162 See id.
163 See Bryant v. Apple South, Inc., 100 F. Stapp. 2d 1368, 1385 (M.D. Ga. 2000).
161 See Greebel v. FTP Software, Inc., 194 F.3d 185, 196 (I st Cin 1999).
163 See id. at 196.
166 See id. at 197.
167 See id.
166 See id. at 188.
1  See Greebel, 194 F.3d at 188.
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ping from $25.25 to $11.875 per share)" By August 9, 1996, FTP
stock was trading at $8 per share. 171
Like In re Comshare, the FTP litigation arose in part from condi-
tional orders the company booked as revenues. 172 According to the
plaintiffs, the defendants had regularly "whited out" purchase order
terms inserted by customers that made their purchases conditional.'"
The plaintiffs alleged this was done to inflate revenues by improperly
booking as final sales transactions that were contingent. 174 The United
States District Court for the District of Massachusetts, after limited
discovery, found the plaintiffs could not prove the claims and entered
judgment)" The defendants sought dismissal, but the plaintiffs
sought to make their complaint more specific by referring to newly
discovered documents, though they made no formal motion to
amend)" The District Court then dismissed with prejudice)"
According to the plaintiffs, demand for FTP's internet and intra-
net software was diminishing due to the development of substitutes by
end-users, as well as the availability of alternatives from Microsoft,
Netscape and others)" The plaintiffs further alleged that FTP was not
keeping pace with technological changes in the industry)" The plain-
tiffs asserted FTP and several of its directors and officers failed to dis-
close these threats to the company's business and also failed to dis-
close "questionable" sales practices, including "warehouse shipments,"
in which a sale of a product to a fictitious buyer was booked, but the
product was shipped to a warehouse for storage and then returned to
pyRiso The plaintiffs also objected to excessively discounted sales and
"channel stuffing," in which sales and orders were compressed into
the final weeks of a quarter, to improve the reported results for the
period.181 The plaintiffs also complained of the undisclosed "white-
out" practice, in which the company persuaded distributors to order




173 See id. at 188.




178 See id. at 189.
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plaintiffs also charged that FTP made several false and misleading
statements during the class period." 3
For the First Circuit, the case raised a number of questions about
the PSLRA. 184 The court wrote:
First, did the PSLRA alter the standards for pleading particu-
larity previously adhered to by this circuit? Second, did the
PSLRA restrict the characteristic patterns of facts that may
be pleaded in order to establish a 'strong inference' of scien-
ter? Specifically, are the two methods of showing scienter
endorsed by the Second Circuit—motive and opportunity or
circumstantial evidence of reckless or conscious behavior
sufficient to raise a "'strong inference' of fraudulent in-
tent"—now available?"5
Like other circuits before it, the court noted that "on some of the
points neither text nor history is indisputably clear." 156 Indeed, on the
question of which characteristic patterns of facts may be pleaded,
specifically whether motive and opportunity satisfies the PSLRA, the
court stated that the history is "irretrievably conflicted." 187 The court
then succinctly set forth the limited common ground on the question:
About all that can be said with confidence on that issue is
that Congress agreed on the need to curb abuses, that it at-
tempted to do so in the guise of what are articulated as pro-
cedural requirements, and that there was agreement on the
183 See id. For example, on the first day of the class period, the company's president
and chief executive officer touted the second-quarter results and said sales continued to be
strong, despite the cancellation of a planned $10 million purchase by the French Post
Office. See id. At the same time, the president announced a reorganization; according to
the plaintiffs, however, he failed to disclose that its costs would be continued over the long
term. See id. Subsequent optimistic statements followed, which the plaintiffs alleged were
false and misleading. See id. During the class period, moreover, several individual defen-
dants sold more than $23 million in FTP stock. See id. at 190. The complaint charged that
the truth came to light on January 4. 1996 when FTP announced fourth-quarter results
would fall below those of the prior year, prompting a $27 drop in market value from the
class period high. See id. at 189-90.
181 See Greebel, 194 F.3d at 191-92.
183 Id. at 191-92. The court also questioned, as other circuits had before it, whether
the PSLRA altered the substantive scienter requirement, ultimately holding that the
PSRLA did not alter the substantive definition of scienter. See id. at 192, 198-201.
186 See id. at 192.
187 See id.
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words of the statute and on little else. And so we return to
the text of the statute and its purpose. 188
The First Circuit then determined that the PSLRA's pleading
standard is consistent with the prevailing First Circuit interpretation
of Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which it de-
scribed as "strict and rigorous."'"
Beginning its consideration of the viability of the motive and op-
portunity test, the court noted that Congress intended that scienter
could be proven by inference, thus acknowledging the role of indirect
and circumstantial evidence.'" According to the court, it is also true
that the words of the PSLRA "neither mandate nor prohibit the use of
any particular method" of establishing the requisite strong infer-
ence. 191 Furthermore, the court wrote, the PSLRA pleading standard
is tougher than that for other civil litigation because under Rule
12(b) (6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, all inferences must
be drawn in favor of the plaintiffs; under the PSLRA, however, infer-
ences of scienter survive a motion to dismiss only if they are both rea-
sonable and strong.'"
With the benefit of the decisions by several other Courts of Ap-
peals, the First Circuit suggested "the debate about adoption or rejec-
tion of prior Second Circuit standards strikes us as somewhat beside
the point. The categorization of patterns of facts as acceptable or un-
acceptable to prove scienter or to prove fraud has never been the ap-
proach this circuit has taken to securities fraud."'" Rather, the court
wrote, it has analyzed particular facts in each individual complaint
and weighed them to see if they were sufficient to support scienter. 194
The court then described a number of fact patterns it has held rele-
199 Id. at 192.
'89 See Greebel, 194 F.3d at 193. hi particular, the First Circuit required fraud plaintiffs to
specify each allegedly misleading statement or omission. See id. The First Circuit also de-
manded that securities plaintiffs explain why the contested statement or omission is mis-
leading by requiring that the complaint include factual support for the fraud allegations.
See id. This requirement has been satisfied by the provision of specific details such as the
time, place and content of the alleged misrepresentations, as well as "factual allegations
that would support a reasonable inference that adverse circumstances existed at the dine
of the offering, and were lutowi ► and deliberately or recklessly disregarded by defendants."
Id. at 193-94 (citing Romani v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, 929 F.2d 875, 878 (1st Cir.
1991)).
1 " See id. at 195.
191 See id. at 195.
192 See id. at 195-96; see FED. R. ay. P. 12(6)(6).
195 See id.
194
 See Greebel, 194 F.3d at 196.
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vant to show scienter, including insider trading, thë personal interest
of certain directors in not informing disinterested directors of an im-
pending sale of stock and the self-interested motivation of defendants
who seek to save their salaries or jobs. 193 The court concluded that,
41 , a number of these cases could be thought of as falling into
motive ,and opportunity patterns, this court continues to prefer a
more fact-specific inquiry." 196 The court acknowledged that it had in
some decisions indicated that a "reasonable" inference was necessary
to survive a illation to dismiss, although it required a "strong" infer-
ence on other occasions. 07 The court then stated that henceforth the
strong inference standard would prevail, in light of its explicit inclu-
sion in the PSLRA. 198
In considering the complaint against FTP, the court divided the
allegations into those that amounted to direct evidence of scienter
and those that were indirect evidence of scienter. 199 In the former
category were the allegations of white-outs and warehousing. 200 Be-
cause the District Court had determined that the plaintiffs could not
produce admissible evidence to support the white-out charges they
were disregarded by the court. 201 With respect to the warehousing al-
legations, particularly. the charge that an employee who refused to
sign for the "returned" product and complained about the practice
was terminated, the court found the complaint deficient. 202 The com-
plaint said only that this incident took place before the class period
and alleged, on information and belief, that the practice continued
during the class period. 2°3 There were no specifics, however, about
why the plaintiffs believed the practice continued or how it harmed
195 See id.
196 See id. at 196. Adopting the approach of several other circuits, the court wrote that
although it rejected FTP's argument that facts showing motive and opportunity can never
be enough to withstand a motion to dismiss, it cautioned plaintiffs that merely pleading
motive and opportunity, regardless of the strength of the inferences of scienter such facts
convey, will not be enough. See id. at 196. The court made similar statements about insider
trading allegations, noting that the trading must take place when the defendants have
incentives to withhold material, non-public information and the trading must be well be-
yond the defendant's normal trading patterns. See id. at 197-98.





29° See Creche!, 194 F.3d at 201-02.
to See id.
2°2 See id. at 202.
293 See id.
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the plaintiffs. 2" As a result, the court found the warehousing allega-
tions insufficient to support a strong inference of scienter. 205
Chief among the indirect evidence, according to the court, were
the charges of channel stuffing, contingent sales and insider trad-
ing.2°6 The court read the plaintiffs' channel stuffing complaint to
suggest that management knew revenues would be low in the class
period and that management attempted to conceal that by shifting
income. 2" Although such allegations have some probative value, the
court found them to be weak because there are several legitimate rea-
sons for attempting to achieve sales earlier than actualized. 208 The
court then acknowledged that reporting contingent sales as revenue
could provide evidence of scienter, but agreed with the District Court
that the plaintiffs' complaint did not provide enough details about
the practice. 20° Finally, the court faulted the insider trading allega-
tions in part because the timing was not suspicious. 21° None of the
three key players sold their stock at its high points and each sold their
stock after FTP announced the reorganization but before a favorable
analyst's report that was allegedly manipulated. 211 Furthermore, the
vast majority of the more than $23 million in stock sold by the insiders
was sold by an officer just before and after he left the company.212 In
sum, the plaintiffs "did not have enough weight on their side of the
balance to meet the requirements" of the PSLRA. 218 Accordingly, the
First Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the complaint. 214
IV. THE THWARTED LEGISLATIVE INTENT OF THE PSLRA
Although the preceding discussion shows some courts clearly
have decided otherwise, it is difficult to view the legislative history of
the PSLRA as manifesting anything other than congressional rejection
204 See id.
2°3 See Greebel, 199 F.3d at 202.
2°6 See id. at 202-07.
207 See id. at 202-03.
208
 See id. at 203.
209 See id. at 203-04. Missing were basic details such as the approximate amount by
which revenue and earnings were overstated, the products involved, the dates of any trans-
actions and the identities of customers or FTP employees involved. See id. at 204.
210 See Greebel, 194 F.3d at 206.
Ynt See id.
212 See id.
213 See id. at 207.
214 See id.
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of the motive and opportunity test. 216 This is true for four reasons: (1)
removal of the Specter Amendment by the Conference Committee;
(2) the clear import of the Conference Report and its footnote 23;
(3) the dubious interpretive value of comments surrounding the Se-
curities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998; 216 and (4) most
importantly, the fact that continued application of the motive and
opportunity test would undermine Congress's effort to deter frivolous
securities litigation.217
Congress's intent to shut the door on the motive and opportunity
test is made most clear when one considers the history of the Specter
Amendment, which would have codified the test and which won pas-
sage in the Senate by a vote of 52-47. 218 After Senate passage, Confer-
ence Committee members confronted a House version that left out
the motive and opportunity language and the Senate bill, which in-
cluded the Specter Amendment. 219 Thus, the Committee members
had a clear choice to make and they elected to abandon the motive
and opportunity test.220 As discussed above, some courts have sug-
gested that a rejection of the motive and opportunity test should not
be read into Congress's failure to adopt its terms. 221 This might be
persuasive if Congress simply had never addressed the test in clear
terms, but the action in the Conference Committee can only be in-
terpreted as Congress's reasoned resolution of the question of
whether to permit continued use of the motive and opportunity
test. 222 If the Conference Committee had wanted the motive and op-
portunity test to remain in use, and, in fact, to be adopted uniformly,
the easiest way to do so would have been to keep 'the Specter
Amendment intact in the bill reported out of the Conference Com-
mittee. 228 It chose to excise the Specter Amendment and the implica-
tion is clear.224
Perhaps concerned that courts would fail to heed this implica-
tion, Congress made two further explicit statements, that when taken
215 See Dorelli, supra note 4, at 1217.
216 For a discussion of the role of subsequent legislative history, see Smith, supra note
23, at 606-07.
217 See supra, note 4 and accompanying text.
218 See Dorelli, supra note 4, at 1202 n.79.
219 See id. at 1202.
22° See id.
221 See supra, notes 73-74 and accompanying text.
222 See Dorelli, supra note 4, at 1201-02.
223 See id.
224 See id.
644	 Boston College Law Review	 [Vol. 42:619
together, should resolve any doubt. 225 First, in the Conference Report,
the Conference Committee wrote that it did not intend to codify case
law from the Second Circuit interpreting the strong inference stan-
dard. 226
 In footnote 23, in which the Conference Committee indi-
cated it had declined the opportunity to include Specter's amend-
ment, the Conference Committee again made it clear that Congress
was rejecting the motive and opportunity test. 227
 Essentially, the two
statements read together mean that to further its goal of strengthen-
ing existing pleading requirements, it was instructing courts that alle-
gations of motive and opportunity were no longer sufficient to give
rise to a strong inference of scienter. 228
Proponents of the motive and opportunity test have had to make
this clear legislative history less so to justify their continued employ-
ment of the motive and opportunity test. 229 Their cause may initially
appear bolstered by the comments of the Senate Committee on Bank-
ing, Housing and Urban Affairs about the Uniform Standards Act and
President Clinton's remarks in signing that legislation. 2" Emphasis on
these remarks, which suggest that Congress intended to adopt the
Second Circuit pleading standard and that President Clinton signed
the Uniform Standards Act because of that fact, however, is mis-
placed."' If a subsequent Congress was displeased with the pleading
standard called for by the PSLRA, it retained the option to enact new
legislation codifying the motive and opportunity test. 282 Permitting
future Congresses to change the plain meaning of statutes enacted by
past Congresses by issuing remarks that are never voted on nor signed
into law would be a dangerous precedent.
Finally, continued use of the motive and opportunity test
conflicts with the clearly-articulated goal of the PSLRA—the elimina-
tion before discovery of frivolous securities fraud suits. 258
 Simply put,
allowing plaintiffs to proceed to discovery on the bare allegation of
motive and opportunity would offer publicly-traded companies in-
225 See id. at 1202.
226 See id.; supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text.
227 See suPro note 19 and accompanying text; DoreIli, supra note 4, at 1202.
22 See DoreIli, supra note 4, at 1202.
229 See supra notes 66-68,186-188 and accompanying text.
230 See supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text; Smith, supra note 23, at 606.
231 SeeSmith, supra note 23, at 606.
232 See id.
253 See supra note 4 and accompanying text; In re Silicon Graphics, Inc. Securities Liti-
gation, 183 F.3d 970,977-78 (9th Cir. 1999).
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adequate protection. 234 As the Supreme Court has noted, when in-
sufficiently stringent pleading standards allow frivolous securities suits
to advance to the discovery stage, the settlement cost to defendants
rises in a way unrelated to the merits of the complaint. 235
Despite these facts, nearly all the circuit courts that have reached
the question of the PSLRA pleading standard have left the door open
to pleadings of motive and opportunity. The Second and Third Cir-
cuits explicitly interpreted the PSLRA's legislative history as a
codification of the motive and opportunity test. 236 The Sixth and
Eleventh Circuits claimed to have read the history as rejecting the
test, but allowed that allegations of motive and opportunity continue
to have relevance to plaintiffs' pleadings. 237 The First Circuit upheld
the continued vitality of motive and opportunity pleadings, holding
only that they must be stronger in the wake of the PSLRA. 238 Only the
Ninth Circuit interpreted the PSLRA as an outright rejection of the
motive and opportunity test. 236
Nonetheless, those that fear judicial unwillingness to stand firm
against pleadings of motive and opportunity can take a small amount
of comfort; despite questionable conclusions about the intent of the
PSLRA regarding the motive and opportunity test, only in the case of
Press v. Chemical Investment Services Corp., can it be said that a complaint
that should have been dismissed was allowed to proceed. 240 In the
other cases discussed in this Note, the courts dismissed complaints
that were clearly of the sort Congress sought to deter when it passed
the PSLRA.
In Press, in which the plaintiff asserted that Chemical fraudu-
lently maintained the use of his funds for four days, the Second Cir-
cuit acknowledged the bareness of the claim and accurately described
it as one alleging motive and opportunity. 24t The language of the de-
cision suggests that such a pleading is the barest that would survive a
motion to dismiss. 242 This establishment of Press's pleading as a base-
line is ineffective, however, for the purpose of achieving Congress's
"4 See Silicon Graphics, 183 F.3d at 977-78.
233 See Dorelli, supra note 4, at 1195-96 (citing Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores,
421 U.S. 723,739-41 (1975)).
236 See supra notes 31-80 and accompanying text.
237 See supra notes 118-163 and accompanying text.
233 See supra notes 164-214 and accompanying text.
"9 See supra notes 81-117 and accompanying text.
240 See 166 F.3d at 532-33; supra notes 32-54 and accompanying text.
241 See supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text.
242 See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
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goal of deterring frivolous securities litigation because the facts in
Press were so innocuous that it is hard to imagine how any competent
plaintiffs' attorney could ever fail to top them.
On the facts, the Second Circuit's refusal to dismiss Press's claim
is at odds with the objectives of the PSLRA. 243 Standing alone,. Chemi-
cal's failure to tell Press in advance that he would have to wait four
days beyond the maturity date to collect his deposit and interest and
that the bank would charge a mark-up of $158.86 hardly gives rise to a
suggestion that Chemical intended to defraud the plaintiff. 244 Instead,
Press's complaint merely alleged motive—and a weak one at that—
and opportunity.245
 His complaint should have been dismissed.
Unlike the Second Circuit, the Third Circuit engaged in an ex-
tensive discussion of legislative history to reach its conclusion that the
PSLRA codified the motive and opportunity test.246 The court stum-
bles in that effort, however, because, while disclaiming reliance on
comments about the PSLRA made in the context of the Uniform
Standards Act, it nevertheless uses that background to support its po-
sition that Congressional intent is uncertain. 247 Furthermore, in In re
Advanta Corp. Securities Litigation, the Third Circuit based its conclu-
sion in part on its belief that the Second Circuit standard was the most
stringent in place at the time the PSLRA was enacted. 248 This argu-
ment, however, ignores the footnote in the Conference Report indi-
cating Congress was not locking in the Second Circuit approach be-
cause it wanted a heightened standard. 249 Additionally, the Third
Circuit said Congress could have explicitly eliminated the motive and
opportunity test, but chose not to. 25° In fact, as suggested earlier,
Congress's actions should be viewed as having explicitly rejected the
motive and opportunity test. 251 Indeed, the House-Senate Conference
Committee removed the Specter Amendment, an action that should
be seen as having the same strength as excising the language from an
243 See supra notes 32-45 and accompanying text.
244 See supra notes 32-45 and accompanying text.
245 See supra notes 32-45 and accompanying text.
245 See supra notes 55-77 and accompanying text.
247 See In re Advanta Securities Corp. Litigation, 180 F.3d 525,533 (3d Cir. 1999). The
Third Circuit suggested "there is little to gain in attempting to reconcile the conflicting
expressions of legislative intent," including comments related to the Uniform Standards
Act, and used what it considered to be a conflicting legislative history to justify a reading of
the statute's plain language that supported the motive and opportunity test. See id. at 533.
248 See id. at 534.
249 See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
250 See supra notes 73-74 and accompanying text.
251 See supra notes 218-224 and accompanying text; Dorelli, supra note 4, at 1201-02.
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already-enacted piece of legislation. 252 Finally, the Third Circuit's ar-
gument that requiring that pleadings be made with particularity
would result in a heightened pleading standard in the Third Circuit
and, therefore, satisfy the PSLRA is faulty. 253 Although it May be true
that such an innovation would make life more difficult for securities
plaintiffs in the Third Circuit, it is not proof that the court had gone
far enough to satisfy Congress. The fact that "catch-all allegations"
would no longer suffice in the Third Circuit only serves as a recogni-
tion that Congress was right to see past practices as demonstrating the
need for a heightened pleading standard, not as proof that the plead-
ing standard had now been raised to the level sought by Congress. 254
Despite its continued adherence to the motive and opportunity
test, the Third Circuit correctly affirmed dismissal of the complaint
against Advanta. The allegations in the case, the use of low teaser
rates to win customers, the subsequent repricing of those accounts at
rates lower than one company official once stated was Advanta's plan,
and trades in company stock by executives, failed to give rise to a
strong inference that the company had defrauded investors. 255 The
plaintiffs' complaint offered no evidence to suggest repricing deci-
sions were based on anything other than a desire to retain those cus-
tomers induced by the teaser rates and that an apparent change in
position on the post-introductory rates was intended to defraud inves-
tors.256 Absent such evidence, and in light of the fact that trading by
insiders was not sufficient to give rise to a strong inference of fraudu-
lent intent, dismissal was the correct disposition.257
Meanwhile, the Sixth and Eleventh Circuits wrote their decisions
as if they were heeding the Congressional call to cease using the mo-
tive and opportunity test.258 A close look at the language in their deci-
sions, however, suggests otherwise. 259 To wit, in In re Comshare, Inc. Se-
curities Litigation, the Sixth Circuit indicated that although bare
motive and opportunity allegations would not be enough to show a
strong inference of scienter, such allegations may be relevant to a
pleading of the required state of mind. 260 The problem with this
252 See id.
253
 See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
254 See septa notes 76-77 and accompanying text.
2" See supra notes 57-65 and accompanying text.
2" See supra notes 78-79 and accotnpanying text.
257 See Advanta, 180 F.3d at 541.
258 See supra notes 118-163 and accompanying text.
2" See supra notes 135,156 and accompanying text.
560 See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
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stance is two-fold: first, it is unhelpful in illuminating precisely what
relevance allegations of motive and opportunity might have; second,
it simply runs afoul of Congress's intent to do away with the motive
and opportunity test. 261
In In re Cornshare, however, the Sixth Circuit was correct to dismiss
the allegations. 262 The facts of In re Comshare show a company that
made quick and candid disclosure of newly-discovered conditional
orders previously booked as revenue.263 Furthermore, in the year in
which the accounting errors took place, a corrected accounting
showed that total revenue for the year had still risen 9.8%. 2" Making
companies in such situations vulnerable to litigation would only dis-
courage disclosure; thus frustrating one of the overarching aims of
the nation's securities laws.265 The Sixth Circuit's affirmance of the
complaint's dismissal was correct.
The Eleventh Circuit in Bryant v. Avado Brands, Inc., repeated the
Sixth Circuit's interpretive mistake, rejecting the motive and oppor-
tunity test but indicating that pleadings of motive and opportunity
still may be relevant. 266
 The Eleventh Circuit also was wrong to suggest
that because the PSLRA requires pleadings to give rise to a strong in-
ference of whatever substantive standard of scienter a given circuit
applies and because motive and opportunity is not the required state
of mind, a showing of motive and opportunity would be in-
sufficient.267 As discussed by the First Circuit in Greebel v. FTP Software,
251 See supra note 135 and accompanying text. What the court said is that 'while facts
regarding motive and opportunity may be 'relevant to pleading circumstances from which
a strong inference of fraudulent scienter may be inferred,' and may, on occasion, rise to
the level of creating a strong inference of reckless or knowing conduct, the bate pleading
of motive and opportunity does not, standing alone, constitute the pleading of a strong
inference of scienter." See In re Coinshare, Inc. Securities Litigation, 183 F.3d 542, 551 (6th
Cir. 1999) (quoting In re Baesa Securities Litigation, 969 F. Supp. 238, 242 (S.D.N.Y.
1997)). In effect, the Sixth Circuit's analysis tends to lead to a holding close to that of the
First Circuit, which held that allegations of motive and opportunity must simply be
stronger than required in the past to satisfy the PSLRA. See Creche! v FTP Software, Inc.,
194 F.3d 185, 197 (1st Cir. 1999).
262 See Cornshare, 183 F.3d at 546-47.
265 See supra notes 122-127 and accompanying text.
264 See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
265 In Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 229, 230 (1988), the Supreme Court noted that it
had "repeatedly ... described the 'fundamental purpose' of [die Securities Exchange Act
of 1934] as implementing a 'philosophy of full disclosure." Id. (citing Santa Fe Industries, •
Inc. v. Green, 930 U.S. 462, 477-78 (1977) (quoting SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau,
Inc., 375 U.S. 180,186 (1963)).
sin See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
207 See supra notes 157-159 and accompanying text.
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Inc., however, by using the word "inference," Congress clearly envi-
sioned that the required state of mind may be pled based on circum-
stantial and indirect evidence, of which motive and opportunity would
be examples had Congress not made it clear it disfavored this particu-
lar breed of circumstantial evidence. 268 Instead of rejecting the motive
and opportunity test for its stated reason, the Eleventh Circuit should
have rejected it for all the reasons noted earlier.
When Bryant was remanded to the District Court, the lower court
correctly dismissed the complaint, although the Eleventh Circuit's
rejection of the motive and opportunity test was more equivocal than
warranted by the statute. 269 In essence, the plaintiffs' complaint
against Avado Brands amounted to a disagreement over the defen-
dants' aggressive growth plans. 2" The complaint alleged nothing to
suggest that the new restaurants and the sale of debt securities to fa-
cilitate Avado's growth were designed to defraud investors, rather
than make the company more profitable. 271 Trades by insiders, offer-
ing only an inference of motive, failed to raise the allegations to the
level necessary to avoid dismissal and, thus, the District Court prop-
erly dismissed the case. 272
The First Circuit, meanwhile, erred in suggesting that, if
sufficiently strong, pleadings of motive and opportunity would he
sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss. 273 In Greebel, the court said
Congressional history is conflicted and took advantage of these cir-
cumstances to attempt to achieve Congress's goal of a heightened
pleading standard by tinkering with the circuit's historical pleading
standards. 274 It is only true that the PSLRA's history is conflicted,
however, if one emphasizes comments by the Senate Banking Com-
mittee and President Clinton upon the passage of legislation that fol-
lowed the PSLRA by four years.275 As noted repeatedly, an assessment
of the Conference Committee report and the history of Senator Spec-
ter's amendment makes clear that the motive and opportunity test
should not survive. 276 Like the Third Circuit, the First Circuit also ap-
2°8 See194 F.3d at 195.
269 See Bryant v. Apple South, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 1368 (M.D. Ga. 2000) [hereinafter
Bryant ill.
27° See supra notes 142-148 and accompanying text.
271 See Si/Pra note 163 and accompanying text.
272 See Bryant II, 100 F. Supp. 2d at 1385-86.
272 See supra notes 164-214 and accompanying text.
214 See supra notes' 186-188, 197-198 and accompanying text.
276 See supra notes 230-231 and accompanying text; Smith, supra note 23, at 582-83.
276 See supra notes 218-228 and accompanying text; Dorelli, supra note 4, at 1201-02.
650	 Boston College Law Review 	 [Vol. 42:619
peared to believe that by raising its own pleading standards in some
way it would be satisfying Congress's wishes."' For the First Circuit,
this took the form of insisting that future complaints give rise to a
strong inference of scienter, rather than merely a reasonable infer-
ence, as the court had sometimes required prior to the PSLRA. 275 Al-
though this is a step in the right direction, it is not enough.
The First Circuit dramatically illustrated the effect of a properly-
interpreted PSLRA when it listed various fact patterns that it had held
sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss and went on to acknowl-
edge that many of them could be said to fall into the category of mo-
tive and opportunity. 279
 If such motive and opportunity allegations
could no longer survive a motion to dismiss, plaintiffs would be dis-
couraged from filing complaints based on such fact patterns and the
Congressional goal of reducing the number of frivolous securities
suits would be achieved.
Despite its continued allowance of motive and opportunity plead-
ings, the First Circuit did.reach the correct result on the facts before it
in Greebel, affirming the District Court's dismissal of the complaint. 280
Greebel's complaint failed the "state with particularity" requirement
of the PSLRA with regard to many of its allegations 2 81 Although the
allegations of "white-out" activity and warehousing would give rise to a
strong inference of fraudulent intent if sufficiently detailed, the plain-
tiff's complaint lacked the necessary facts. 282 Additionally, the allega-
tions of insider trading simply did not describe sales that were "out of
the ordinary or suspicious. "283 The court was right to uphold the Dis-
trict Court's dismissal.
Finally, unlike the First Circuit, the Ninth Circuit correctly found
that Congress intended to foreclose a successful pleading based on
motive and opportunity. 284 In In re Silicon Graphics, the Ninth Circuit
artfully explained that showings of motive and opportunity might, in
some cases, be sufficient to support a reasonable inference of intent,
but would never be enough to create a strong inference of the re-
quired state of mind. 255
217 See supra notes 197-198 and accompanying text.
278 See supra notes 197-198 and accompanying text.
279 See supra notes 194-196 and accompanying text.
280 See supra notes 172-183 and accompanying text.
2" See Greebel, 194 F.3d at 201.
282 See id. at 201-02.
283 See id. at 207.
2" See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
283 See Silicon Graphics, 183 F.3d at 974.
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The Ninth Circuit has been the only federal appeals court to
combine the correct interpretation of the PSLRA with the appropri-
ate result on the facts. Instead of particular facts giving rise to a strong
inference of fraud, the plaintiffs' complaint simply made a blanket
allegation that the Silicon Graphics defendants were aware of negative
internal reports when they made optimistic statements about the
company. 286 The complaint was devoid of details about these reports,
however.287 Furthermore, although the trades by insiders were
sufficiently detailed, given the amounts involved and the timing no
court could have found they gave rise to the requisite strong infer-
ence.288 Accordingly, the court was correct in affirming the dismissal.
CONCLUSION
The foregoing analysis makes clear that Congress intended to
halt use of the motive and opportunity test in favor of a heightened
and uniform pleading standard for securities suits. Cases decided
since passage of the PSLRA, however, show that federal courts have
not only continued to find a place for the motive and opportunity
test, but have also failed to coalesce around a single pleading stan-
dard. Although the above analysis suggests that these failings gener-
ally have not kept the federal courts from deciding these cases prop-
erly, Congress's goals would be better served if the motive and
opportunity test were unequivocally rejected.
A uniform and heightened standard would deter more suits than
one in which mere allegations of motive and opportunity were
sufficient, or at least had some relevance. A tougher standard would
allow defendant companies to better resist the extortionate settlement
demands of plaintiffs. In a time of stock market volatility, such as ex-
ists today, honest enterprise needs the protection a uniform and truly
heightened pleading standard would provide. Congress should re-
examine the issue and pass remedial legislation making it clear allega-
tions of motive and opportunity no longer suffice to open the door to
discovery. If Congressional action is not forthcoming, the Supreme
Court should step in to resolve this split among the circuits.
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2 See supra notes 112-114 and accompanying text.
287 See id.
288 See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
